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1 Introduction 
Since the mid 1970s regional policy has existed at the EU community level. Today, 
roughly one third of the EU budget is devoted to structural measures. The regional 
policy’s main objective is to redistribute among regions and countries. Obviously, there 
is an equity argument for community action in favour of weak economic regions. Fur-
thermore, in the presence of externalities even efficiency might require intergovernmen-
tal grants from the community to member states. However, looking at the history of the 
regional policy, it becomes clear that the funds system in regional policy is mainly an 
instrument for side payments among member states that are linked to mayor changes in 
the European Union (see Baldwin et al., 1997; Heinemann, 1999). The first and largest 
fund in regional policy, the European Regional Development Fund, was created in 1975 
when the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland became members of the European 
Union (see Nevin, 1990). When in 1986 Spain and Portugal joined the European Union, 
the community assumed the competence for its own regional policy with the Single 
European Act. The ratification was accompanied by a doubling of the structural spend-
ing. In 1993 the cohesion fund which benefits Ireland and the southern countries was 
established in order to enable these countries to meet the Maastricht criteria (see Tondl, 
2001). Without the money from the cohesion fund the southern countries were not 
willing to approve the monetary union and the northern enlargement in 1995. Hence, 
the regional policy – and even the Common Agriculture Policy – can be considered as a 
complex system of side payments. Side payments are indispensable to make the deci-
sion bodies at the community level work – in particular if unanimity is required – and to 
achieve Pareto-improvements in a complex system such as the EU (Bird, 1967). 
Instead of just giving money to the member states, the structural funds co-
finance policy measures by the member states according to common rules laid down by 
the EU authorities. For instance, the poorer member countries receive 85 per cent of 
project costs from the cohesion fund. Hence, the funds system makes use of matching 
grants instead of unconditional grants. However, it is well known from the basic theory 
of intergovernmental grants that the upper level of government should not distort the 
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decisions at the lower level of government when the aim is simply one of redistribution 
of resources from the upper to the lower level. Only in the presence of externalities is a 
matching grant superior to an unconditional grant. Indeed, the EU competence in re-
gional policy is usually justified by a hint towards externalities. Under objective one, 
for instance, EU regional policy focuses on economic and environmental infrastructure. 
However, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that cross country external effects are not 
very large. In the cohesion countries the EU has funded a tremendous improvement of 
the public road network with reference to Trans European Networks, although the ex-
ternal impact of a new road, for example in the south of Spain, on other member states 
is clearly not large enough to call for a 85 per cent matching rate. Apart from techno-
logical externalities, the public choice approach offers several alternative explanations 
for the preference for matching grants. Politicians and bureaucrats at the community 
level have more power with matching grants. Some countries are lacking in efficient 
and non corrupt institutions to manage regional policy effectively. The EU regional 
policy is a superior substitute for a missing efficient national administration. 
This paper considers the EU regional policy as a substitute for explicit side pay-
ments and offers another explanation – from a normative and a positive point of view – 
of why matching grants instead of unconditional grants are used. It focuses on vertical 
fiscal externalities created by the EU system of own resources. The budget of the EU is 
mainly financed from four sources: custom duties levied on products from third 
countries, levies on the production of sugar, VAT-based own resources and GNP-based 
own resources. The last two sources account for roughly three-quarters of the EU 
budget. The VAT-based own resources are shares of their VAT revenues that the mem-
ber states pay to the European Union. The uniform rate applied to national VAT bases is 
determined by the community. The GNP-based own resources are contributions of the 
member states to the European Union where a uniform contribution rate is applied to 
the GNP. The amount of the GNP resource needed is determined as a residual revenue 
in order to make up for the difference between total expenditure and the sum of all other 
- 3 - 
revenues. This paper analyses the repercussions of the regional policy on the VAT-
based and GNP based own resources. 
Regional policy generates a positive vertical fiscal externality in such a EU reve-
nue system. When public infrastructure raises productivity, it also increases the 
payments of the member state to the EU since contributions are (partially) determined 
by the gross national product. Hence, through the EU budget other member states also 
benefit from national or local public infrastructure. It is shown that due to these fiscal 
externalities efficiency requires matching grants. This result confirms the analysis by 
Dahlby (1996) and Boadway and Keen (1996) who have shown in somewhat different 
models that in the presence of vertical fiscal externalities vertical transfers are neces-
sary. Furthermore, this paper stresses the strength of the political process in the EU. 
Arguing that government representatives in EU bodies take the impact of intergovern-
mental grants on local or national authorities into account, it is shown that EU regional 
policy will make use of matching grants if regional policy is really a substitute for 
explicit side payments. In a different setting, Boadway and Keen (1996) have already 
shown that the upper level of government as a first mover determines the vertical trans-
fer so as to achieve efficiency. In line with their analysis, it is shown here that efficient 
matching grants will be the outcome of an unbiased bargaining process at the EU com-
munity level provided that the EU moves first.  
The paper is organised as follows. The model and the results are derived in sec-
tion two, section three gives a rough estimate of the empirical importance of the effects, 
and section four concludes. 
2 The model 
The model is a two-period model which analyses a union consisting of two countries. 
One country is a receiver of resources, the other country, indicated by an asterisk, is a 
net payer. The two countries play a simple three-stage game. At the first stage, they 
decide co-operatively on the size of unconditional grants and on a matching grant rate, 
i.e. a rate by which the union co-finances public infrastructure in the receiver country. 
At the second stage, the receiver country decides how much national resources are 
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devoted to public infrastructure given the matching grant rate. At the third stage, sav-
ings, investment, production and consumption take place in both countries.  
The analysis starts with the third stage. For simplicity, gross income per capita 
in the net-payer country in both periods is not endogenously determined: y1* and y2*.1 
The population is homogeneous in each country. The population size is constant in both 
countries and denoted by L and L*, respectively. Since income and population in the 
net-payer country are fixed, the following analysis of the third stage focuses on the 
receiver country. The factors of production in that country are labour, capital and public 
infrastructure. Labour is internationally immobile and each individual supplies inelasti-
cally exactly one unit of labour. Capital, denoted by K, is internationally mobile. Com-
pared with the rest of the world the union is small, so capital earns the constant world 
interest rate r. Public infrastructure is indicated by G. Production takes place according 
to a linearly homogeneous production function with positive but decreasing marginal 
products: F(L, K, G) = L f(k, g), where the per-capita variables are denoted by lower-
case variables. Public infrastructure and capital are complementary: FKG = fkg/L > 0.2 
Public infrastructure is rival but free of charge. The depreciation rates of capital and 
public infrastructure are zero. The wage rate in period i is denoted by wi. Then, the 
aggregate profit in period i, i = 1, 2, is  
iiiiii rKLwGKLF −−=Π ),,( . 
Profit maximisation leads to ( ) rGKLF iiK =,,  and ( ) iiiL wGKLF =,, . Hence, the ag-
gregate profit  is strictly positive. It is assumed that the number of 
(identical) firms in the country is exogenous. Furthermore, the firms are domestically 
owned and property rights are equally distributed among the population. Capital in 
period one is, for the sake of concreteness, also domestically owned. Using the first–
order conditions with respect to capital and labour and taking into account that the wage 
ii GG )iGi KLF ,,(=Π
                                                 
1  To endogenise income of the net-payer country is a simple exercise, but does not provide additional 
insight. 
2  Partial derivatives are indicated by subscripts. 
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rate changes to adapt labour demand to labour supply, the impact of an increase in the 
quantity of public infrastructure on capital can be derived as 
0>−== kkkgiiii ffdgdkdGdK
1111 )1(/)1( krswLc ++−+Π=+
. 
δ
srwLc )1(/)1( 222 +++Π=+δ
A household’s income consists of labour income, a profit share and capital in-
come. In each period income is used for consumption, savings and, by assumption, 
VAT taxation. As a result, within the two-period framework the budget constraints are  
, 
, 
where s denotes gross savings in period 1, ci is consumption in period i and δ  is the 
uniform VAT tax rate in both periods. The household derives utility from private con-
sumption and a union public good Pi in each period i, with Pi > 0: u(c1, c2, P1, P2), 
where u is a strictly quasi-concave utility function. For the ease of exposition we as-
sume the utility function to exhibit additive separability. Hence, cross derivatives of the 
utility function are zero, especially 0
1221
== cccc uu . By the choice of savings s the 
household maximises u(c1, c2, P1, P2) subject to the two budget constraints, taking the 
wage rates, the interest rate, profits and union public good quantities as given. At the 
household optimum the marginal rate of substitution 
21 cc
uu  equals the price of period-
one consumption 1 + r. The indirect utility function can be written as v(y, r, P1, P2), 
where y is the present value of income net of taxes: 
( ) ( )rcwLckrwLy +−+Π+−+++Π= 1)1( 2221111 δδ . 
The government of the receiver country invests in public infrastructure  and 
contributes to the union budget in two ways. The union receives a share of the VAT tax 
revenues of the member states and it obtains contributions from the member states. We 
reproduce the EU procedure of balancing the budget by assuming the following in the 
model. The VAT tax share is determined exogenously at a rate 
12 gg −
δ/t , where  is fixed so t
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that 0 1/ << δt
i
. The contributions are defined in terms of gross domestic product.3 The 
contribution rates are determined endogenously in order to fill up the gap in the union’s 
budget between expenditure and VAT share. That is, the receiver country pays as VAT 
tax share tc  and contributes  in period i, where τ)g,k(Lf iiiτ i denotes the contribution 
rate in period i. From the union’s budget the country receives per capita an uncondi-
tional grant z in period 1 and a conditional grant ( )12 gg −α . Furthermore, the govern-
ment levies VAT taxes within the country and runs, possibly, a debt. However, at period 
2, debt is redeemed. Therefore, in per-capita terms the government budget constraints in 
the receiver country are 
( )111 , gkf 2g1 zc =+++ ταδ
dr)1( ++fc 22 =+ τδ
bsd +=
( ) ( )( ( )12 kkb12 gg11 1ct −−−−−= ατ
( ) ( gk 1(22ct 1 22 +−+−= τ
( ) 1121 tcdggg +++− , 
( ) tcgkg , 2222 + , 
where d denotes public debt per capita.  
The country as a whole potentially borrows from the rest of the world, but for-
eign debt is redeemed in period two. Indicating per-capita foreign debt by b, the capital 
market equilibrium condition in per-capita terms is 
k +2 . 
Hence, from the household-budget constraints, the government budget con-
straints and the capital-market equilibrium, the resource constraints in the receiver 
country in per-capita terms can be derived as 
) ( ) ( )11 1,1 zgkf ++−+ , (1) 
) ( ) brgkf ),1 22 ++ . 
The union finances with the VAT tax shares and the contributions of the member 
states unconditional and conditional grants to the receiver country and public consump-
                                                 
3  Since the international economic transactions are modeled only rudimentary, defining contributions in 
terms of gross domestic product fits best. However, the analysis would not be changed substantially if 
contributions were defined in terms of gross national product.  
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tion goods, which are non-rival at the union level. The union is excluded from getting 
into debt by constitutional constraints. The union’s budget constraints are given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )zggLPcLLctyLgkLf +−+=+++ 121111111 ****),( ατ  
( ) ( 2222222 ****),( PcLLctyLgkLf ) =+++τ  
The public good quantities and the VAT shares are exogenous, but by adjust-
ments of the contribution rates, which are the same for both countries, the union’s 
budget is balanced in every period. Taking into account the resource constraints (1) we 
yield: 
( )( ) (
( )( )
)
**),(1
**
111
11121
1 yLgkLf
RLLRzggLP
+−
+−+−+= θ
θατ  and ( )( )( )**),(1 ** 222 2222 yLgkLf
RLLRP
+−
+−= θ
θτ , 
where ( tt +≡ 1/ )θ  is the gross VAT tax rate and  and  are defined as: 1R 2R
( ) ( )( ) ( )1212111 1, kkbzgggkfR −−++−−−= α      and  
( ) brgkgkfR )1(, 22222 +−++=  
The next step is to analyse the second stage, where the receiver country decides 
on public infrastructure. It is assumed that the government maximises the welfare of the 
representative consumer . Taking the budget constraints of households and 
the government, the capital market equilibrium condition and the budget constraints of 
the union into account, the government simply maximises the present value of the con-
sumer’s net income, i.e., it solves  
( 21 ,,, PPryv )
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yMax
g2
, where  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )22121
222221212111
222111
1
,1
1
11,1
,1
1
,
gk1
1 1
r
rggzg
gkgkf
r
ggzkkgkf
gkf
r
gkf
++−−+++

++−++−−−+−−−
−++
α
τατ
ττ
k
y
+

−
−=
θ
 
and τ1 and τ2 are defined as given above. Inserting all the budget constraints, the present 
value of consumer’s net income is, in present value per capita terms, the sum of domes-
tic output net of contributions to the union minus the VAT tax shares to the union plus 
the endowment at the beginning of private capital and public infrastructure plus uncon-
ditional and conditional grants minus the loss due to the postponement of consumption 
of private capital and public infrastructure. 
The optimisation problem is so simple because the national government just 
provides public infrastructure, the only national tax is VAT, the interest rate is exoge-
nously determined by the world capital market and the union public good quantities are 
also exogenous. Therefore, the present value of net income is the single argument of the 
indirect utility function which the government can change. Furthermore, indirect utility 
is strictly monotonically increasing in net income y. Hence, argmax  = 
argmax .  
( )( )212 P,P,r,gyv
( 2gy )
                                                
An interior solution of the government’s optimisation problem is characterised 
by4  
 
 
4  fi is an abbreviation for f(ki, gi). 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 

 −+−−++−−+
−=
2
2
22
2
1
11
2
2
2
2
2
2
,,111
1
1
dg
dgkf
dg
dgkfr
dg
dkrrrf
rdg
dy
g
τττατθ  
0=   (2) 
with  
( )( ) 





 −+−++−= )1(**),(1 22
2
1112
1 αθαθ
τ
dg
db
dg
dk
yLgkLf
L
dg
d
 (3) 
and  
 ( )( )**),(1 2222
2
yLgkLf
L
dg
d
+−−= θ
τ  
( ) ( )







 +−+

 +−++


 +⋅ 2
2
22
2
22
22
2
22 111 gkgk fdg
dkf
dg
dbr
dg
dkf
dg
dkf θτθ  (4) 
In general, the government does not invest in public infrastructure up to the 
point where the marginal product of public infrastructure F gG f=  is equal to the interest 
rate. Therefore, the marginal products of private and public capital may not be equal-
ised. From an international point of view, the allocation of resources is not always first-
best efficient. Furthermore, if the government neglected the impact of public infrastruc-
ture on the contribution rates via grants and the gross domestic product in period two, it 
would equalise the marginal product of public infrastructure net of contributions 
 with the interest rate minus the value of the conditional grant per unit in the 
second period 
( ) 221 gfτ−
( )r+− 1r α  minus the impact on contributions via the change in private 
capital 22 dg2 dkrτ . Compared with the internationally first-best efficient level of 
public infrastructure, overprovision as well as underprovision is possible. If the receiver 
country did not contribute to the union’s budget, i.e., if ( )12 0 ττ ≡≡ , the grant would 
clearly cause overprovision.  
If, however, the government takes the change in the contribution rates into ac-
count, additional ambiguity comes into play. In the first period additional investment in 
public infrastructure increases the union’s expenditure and, if , 
decreases the VAT tax base. Therefore, the contribution rate in the first period tends to 
222 // dgdbdgdk >
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rise. But in the second period, under the same condition, investment in public infrastruc-
ture decreases the contribution rate due to the increase in gross domestic product and an 
increase of the VAT tax base. 
Proposition 1 (Underprovision of public infrastructure). Compared with the first-
best rule the receiver country undersupplies public infrastructure if the country does 
not receive a conditional grant (α = 0). 
Proof. See Appendix A.  
  
 
The intuition for this result is that via the contribution to the union’s budget in 
the second period the receiver country let the union have part of the benefits of invest-
ment in public infrastructure. This positive vertical externality implies an inefficient 
underinvestment in infrastructure. 
Now, the first stage of the game has to be analysed. At this stage, receiver coun-
try and net-payer country take the behaviour of the receiver country’s government into 
account. A situation is considered where the members of the union have to decide 
unanimously on some particular project (for example, a change in the rules of the un-
ion). By assumption, only the net-payer country benefits from a positive vote, while the 
receiver country is harmed. The government of the receiver country is willing to con-
sent to the project if the population achieves a minimum utility level v . It is the affair 
of the net-payer country’s government to determine the composition of grants. How-
ever, given the approval of the receiver country, the net-payer country’s government 
wants to minimise its payments to the union’s budget in present value terms. Hence, the 
government of this country solves 
( ) 

 


++−+


++ r
yy
r
RRLMin
z 1
*
*1
1
*
** 221121,
ττθθα  s.t. ( ) vPPrzy ≥),,,,( 21v α . 
Here, it is assumed that the government of the net-payer country also act’s in the na-
tional interest. In the following analysis, the dual problem  
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( ) ),,,,( 21, PPrzyvMaxz αα  s.t. ( ) Tr
yy
r
RRL =

 


++−+


++ 1
*
*1
1
*
** 221121
ττθθ  (5) 
is considered, where T  is an adequately adjusted payment in present value terms. The 
entire problem of the three-stage game has a simple solution, which is stated by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2 (Efficiency). The government of the net-payer country determines un-
conditional grants and the matching grant rate at the first-stage of the three-stage game 
such that the government of the receiver country will invest up to the point at which the 
marginal product of public infrastructure is equal to the world interest rate. 
Proof. See Appendix B.   
As a result of the multi-stage decision process, the allocation of resources is 
first-best efficient from an international efficiency point of view.5 The reasons for this 
result are twofold. First, the government of the net-payer country actually maximises 
international welfare instead of just national welfare at the first stage of the game since 
it has to concede the receiver country a particular utility level. The bargaining situation 
at this stage of the game ensures efficiency. Second, the actors are foresighted as they 
take the adjustment at the following stages of the game into account. 
Proposition 3 (Optimum matching grant). The optimum matching grant rate is 
 
( )
( ) 0*
*
**1
**1
1
1 1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2 >



−+
−+



 ++= y
y
yLLf
yLLf
dg
dk
r
r
θ
θτα . (6) 
Proof. Inserting  in (A3) in the appendix and solving for rf 2g = α  yields the proposi-
tion immediately.     
                                                 
5  If the solution were a corner solution, the results would slightly change. Some efficiency losses are 
possible. 
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From an international efficiency point of view, the union’s policy should rely 
(partially) on conditional grants. The decision of the receiver country should be dis-
torted through conditional grants, since the benefits of public infrastructure go in part to 
the net-payer country via the gross-domestic-product based contributions to the union. 
Hence, the conditional grant serves as a fiscal “Pigouvian” subsidy that internalises the 
positive vertical fiscal externality of the contributions to the union budget. 
The formula of the optimum grant rate reveals that the vertical fiscal externality 
and, therefore, the optimum matching grant rate is higher, the higher the contribution 
rate 2τ  or the marginal impact of infrastructure on capital dk  is. Furthermore, the 
effect rises if the growth rate of per-capita GDP or the population of the net payer coun-
try increases or of the net receiver country decreases. Now the policy of the EU is to 
lower the VAT share paid by member states to the EU. If 
22 / dg
θ  decreases the impact on the 
externality and the matching rate is ambiguous. According to the partial derivation of α  
from (6) the fiscal externality diminishes if the GDP growth rate of the net payer coun-
try is higher than that of the net receiver country and vice versa: 
1
2
1
2 )(
*
*0)(
f
f
y
y ≥≤⇔≥≤∂
∂
θ
α .  
In fact, as we will see in the next section the net receiver countries in the EU15 grow 
faster than the net payer countries in the last years. Hence, the EU policy of extending 
the GNP-related contributions and reducing the VAT share of the member states implies 
an increasing vertical fiscal externality which in turn calls for higher matching rates in 
regional policy. 
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3 The magnitude of the vertical fiscal externality 
How large is this positive vertical fiscal externality of public infrastructure? We can 
measure the external effect by calculating the value of the expression on the right hand 
side of (6). 
We compute the effect for different values of contribution rates and VAT share 
rates in the years 2001 and 2002. This is because in the Agenda 2000 negotiations the 
member states of the EU agreed on major changes with regard to the revenue side of the 
EU budget as a result of which the VAT tax share was determined to fall and the contri-
bution rate to rise. In consequence, the uniform VAT rate t6 applied to the VAT base of 
member states has been reduced from 0.75 per cent in 2001 to 0.53 per cent in 2002. 
The contribution rate on GNP has increased endogenously from 0.4 per cent in 2001 to 
0.5 per cent in 20027.  
In a first step of the calculation the net payer and the net receiver country are as-
sumed to have the same size of population and GDP per capita: 
. Then the expression in (6) of the vertical fiscal externality 
(VFE) reduces to: 
2,1*,*, === iyfLL ii



 ++= 2
2
2 11 dg
dk
r
rVFE τ . 
                                                 
6 The uniform rate t applied to the VAT bases of the member states is calculated by subtracting a so-
called “frozen” rate from the negotiated maximum rate (2001: 1 per cent; 2002: 0.75 per cent). The 
frozen rate is a correction term for concessions to the United Kingdom and reduced contributions of 
Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden to this concession. The contribution rate 2τ  on the 
GNP of the member states results endogenously as the share of the GNP resource needed to make up 
for the difference between total expenditure and the sum of all other revenue. For details of the calcu-
lation see the Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities’ 
own resources (2000/597/EC, Euratom) 
7 See EU Financial report 2001, p.26 and EU Financial report 2002, p.19. 
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This expression can be easily interpreted. Infrastructure affects GDP and, hence, 
contribution payments to the EU in two ways: first directly and second via its comple-
mentarity with private capital. Thus the vertical fiscal externality increases with the 
contribution rate, the direct effect ( rf g = ), and the indirect effect 
2
22
dg
dkfk . 
For measuring the real effect of infrastructure on GDP we have to take into ac-
count that infrastructure has a long-term effect of several decades and not only for two 
periods (years) as in our model. Although the contribution rate τ  can be expected to 
increase over the next years according to the announced EU policy which would imply 
an even higher vertical fiscal externality, we assume that the contribution rate, the direct 
and the indirect effect of infrastructure remain the same for the next decades. For n 
years the vertical fiscal externality can be measured by the following expression: 
( ) 



+−⋅


 += −1
2
2
2 1
111 nrdg
dkVFE τ . 
We consider the infrastructure effect over a time horizon of n = 50 years and we 
project a real interest rate r of 4 per cent. We estimate the marginal impact of an in-
crease in public infrastructure on capital on basis of a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion: . Hence, ( ) γβγβ −−⋅⋅= 1,, LGKGLKF iiii ( ) 2222 1// gkdgdk −−= βγ .  
At a first guess we would expect that the impact of public infrastructure like 
roads and highways (about 50 per cent of the public infrastructure in Germany), bridges 
and railways, water and sewer systems, dikes and ports, airports etc., is not negligible. 
However, there is a large empirical literature measuring the productivity of public infra-
structure which is far from unanimity8. Aschauer (1989) set off the debate by estimating 
with US data the output elasticity of infrastructure on the national level at about 0.39. 
                                                 
8 A survey until 1992 is provided by Munnell (1992). 
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Other studies at that time estimated a similar high productivity of public infrastructure 
(Munnell, 1990a with 0.34; Holz-Eakin, 1988 with 0.39). These results were challenged 
by some authors who questioned the approach of Aschauer and others and found the 
elasticity too high to be plausible (e.g. Tatom, 1991). Especially public capital on the 
regional level was found to have a significantly lower output elasticity (Duffy-Deno and 
Eberts, 1989: 0.08; Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 1992: 0.05; Seitz, 1995: 0.08-0.19). 
However, recent studies have confirmed the rather high effect of infrastructure on GDP. 
With Canadian data Wylie (1996) estimated an output elasticity of infrastructure capital 
as high as 0.52. Fernald (1999) measured the elasticity of roads, the largest component 
of US infrastructure, at about 0.35. On basis of German data from the manufacturing 
sector Stephan (2001) estimated output elasticities of infrastructure in the range be-
tween 0.42 to 0.65. As a consequence of this debate we assume the following output 
elasticities: 40.0,25.0 == γβ .  
The ratio of private to public capital, k , was in Germany between 1970 and 
1995 in the range of 1.17 to 0.81 (Stephan, 2001). Finding similar ratios in the US 
(Morrison and Schwartz, 1996) we assume a ratio of unity. Now we can calculate that 
in this benchmark case the vertical fiscal externality amounts to 0.527 per cent in 2001 
and 0.672 per cent in 2002. Expecting that the GNP-contribution rate will rise further at 
the same pace the external effect can be assumed to reach a value around 1 per cent. 
22 / g
Now dropping the assumption of equal population and GDP size of the net payer 
and the net receiver countries we compare the economic area of all EU15 net payer 
countries in the relevant period with the economic area of all net receiver countries. The 
net payer countries9 combined had a GNP per capita of Euro 24192 in 2000, Euro 
                                                 
9 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. 
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24933 in 2001, and Euro 25693 in 2002. The net receiver countries10 comprised a GNP 
per capita of Euro 14880 in 2000, Euro 15964 in 2001, and Euro 16812 in 200211. 
Hence, the growth rate of the economic area of the net receiver countries was in both 
years higher than the growth rate of the net payer countries. Our result do not change 
significantly. In 2001 the vertical fiscal externality was 0.524 per cent and in 2002 it 
was 0.668 per cent. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper considers the EU regional policy as a substitute for explicit side payments 
and asked – from a normative and a positive point of view – why matching grants in-
stead of unconditional grants are used. The message of the paper is twofold.  
First, theoretically we identify a positive vertical fiscal externality of public in-
frastructure which is generated by the EU revenue system of own resources. If a region 
invests in infrastructure the repercussions of its higher GNP-related (GDP-related) 
contributions to the EU facilitating the duty of EU-payments from other member states 
are not taken into account. Neglecting this welfare effect on other regions a jurisdiction 
provides an inefficiently low endowment of infrastructure. Therefore, we can offer a 
justification why the EU regional policy employs matching grants in order to support 
the regional investment in infrastructure: matching grants are part of an efficient grant 
system. Based on the assumption that governments at the EU community level move 
before national or local governments execute regional policy, the paper shows that 
matching grants are indeed a part of the EU system if grants under the label of regional 
policy are a substitute for explicit side payments governments and in so far as bargain-
ing in EU bodies is efficient. Hence, a pure system of unconditional grants in the EU is 
neither efficient nor the outcome of political processes. 
                                                 
10 Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. 
11 Source: Eurostat, Statistics in focus, Economy and finance, Theme 2, 1/2002, 53/2002, 56/2003. For 
the population data see Eurostat, Statistics in focus, Population and social conditions, Theme 3, 
16/2000, 19/2001, 25/2002. 
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Second, according to a rough estimate the vertical fiscal externality seems to be 
of a quite small size. Thus, matching grant rates in the magnitude of 85 per cent as are 
granted by the cohesion funds would be far beyond the efficient matching grant rate if 
only the vertical fiscal externality were to be internalised. Other reasons for the steering 
mechanism of matching grants like technological externalities or the interests of EU 
bureaucrats and politicians at the community level have to be added in order to totally 
explain the high matching grants. 
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A: Proof of Proposition 1 
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Now we determine the impact of public infrastructure on foreign debt db . Applying 
the implicit function theorem to the consumer’s first-order condition, , 
yields that the response of foreign debt to changes in infrastructure is positive: 
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If we insert the foreign debt response (A2) in the first-order condition (A1) and solve for 
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For 0=α , (A3) implies  which yields the proposition.        
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B: Proof of proposition 2: 
Proof. The first-order condition of the net-payer country for an interior solution at the first 
stage is  
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The revenue constraint in (5) determines the unconditional grant z as a function of the 
matching grant rate α: 
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where the left-hand side of the revenue constraint is defined as ( )( )zzg ,,,2T αα  and 
α∂∂ 2g  and zg ∂∂ 2  result from the first-order condition of the second stage: 
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The partial derivative of T ( )( zzg ,,,2 )αα  with respect to , using , is given 
by:  
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Inserting (A7) together with zyLzT ∂∂=∂∂  in (A6) yields: 
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it remains to be shown that the numerator in the squared brackets of condition (A8) is not 
zero. In that case (A8) reveals that the net payer country chooses the grants efficiently 
( )rf g =2 . 
Using  the numerator can be written as: 0/ 2 =dgdy
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the numerator can be shown to be positive: 
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This completes the proof.         
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